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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the early seventies, environmental awareness grew and environmental protection started to 
climb up the political agenda. Right from the beginning of the greening of politics, the idea of 
taxing polluting activities dating back to Pigou (1920) has been taken up in the political 
discussion. It was widely accepted that environmental taxes are an efficient instrument to 
protect the environment, superior to the classical environmental policy instruments of 
command and control. 
The enthusiasm for environmental taxes gained momentum with the double dividend 
hypothesis. Tax revenues from environmental or green taxes can be used to cut other taxes. 
This can reap a second dividend as it reduces the distortion due to other taxes. The weak form 
of this hypothesis states that tax revenues from a revenue-neutral green tax reform can be used 
to cut distorting taxes thus lowering the efficiency cost of the green tax reform. The strong 
form of the double dividend asserts that a green tax reform does not only improve the 
environment but also increases non-environmental welfare. If the latter holds, a green tax 
reform would be “a so-called ‘no-regret’ option: even if the environmental benefits are in 
doubt, an environmental tax reform may be desirable” (Bovenberg 1999, p. 421).1 
The weak form of the double dividend hypothesis is widely accepted among 
economists. As a consequence, green tax reforms are nowadays preferred to other 
environmental tax instruments that – although they are efficient in regulating the 
environmental – do not raise public revenues. 
The question as to whether the strong form holds, however, heavily depends on the 
structure of the economy. While a green tax reform is likely to fail to increase non-
environmental welfare in economies with functioning labour markets, it may succeed in 
economies suffering from involuntary unemployment. 
This survey focuses on this distinction in reviewing the literature on the double 
dividend hypothesis and its recent extensions. The next section first provides a brief sketch of 
the classical concept of environmental taxation. Then a model is presented that allows us to (i) 
restate the main results of the double dividend literature derived in the nineties and (ii) discuss 
two important extensions made in the recent literature and how they affect the standard 
results. The first extension focuses on an apparently technical point that, however, turns out to 
                                                 
1  The distinction between the weak and the strong form of the double dividend hypothesis is due to Goulder 
(1995) who surveys the early literature. Recent surveys on the double dividend hypothesis are Bovenberg 
(1995, 1998, 1999), Schöb (1995), Bosello, Carraro and Galeotti (2001) and Kirchgässner (1998).   2
be of importance if it comes to sound policy recommendations: if environmental problems are 
severe, we can expect individuals to protect themselves from the consequences of pollution by 
e.g. buying defensive goods. Severe pollution may also affect labour supply negatively thus 
reducing employment. If this is the case, relaxing the assumption of separability between 
pollution and consumption is an important issue. Furthermore, as the political debate about 
the introduction of green taxes demonstrated, distributional considerations cannot be 
separated from efficiency considerations. Section 2 therefore also studies how optimal tax 
formulae have to be adjusted, taking equity considerations into account. 
The main purpose of the third section is then to point out the importance of the labour 
market for the determination of optimal environmental taxation or – adopting a more 
moderate approach – for welfare improving green tax reform. While the analysis of Section 2 
assumes perfect labour markets and thus may be a good approximation for the US economy, it 
certainly fails to provide an appropriate framework for analysing green tax reforms in 
European countries. Section 3 therefore considers the double-dividend hypothesis for 
imperfect labour markets. This section will analyse under which conditions environmental 
taxes on polluting inputs in production and on polluting consumption goods reap a second 
dividend in the form of an employment dividend and discuss the welfare implication. The aim 
of this section is to point out the differences in the tax incidence for countries with perfect 
labour markets and countries facing labour market imperfections. 
Section 4 turns to the international aspects of environmental taxation. A first important 
question about international environmental problems is whether countries should introduce 
environmental taxes unilaterally or should try to harmonise environmental taxes. This 
question will be addressed by looking at the competitiveness of an economy. Therefore 
Section 4 will use a graphical model for the two models developed in Section 2 and Section 3, 
respectively. Another question concerns the international distribution of the rents 
environmental taxation can generate. Here we stress the fact that environmental problems are 
normally tied to the use of exhaustible resources. Depending on the time path of an 
environmental tax, the extraction rate of natural resources varies and hence the time path of 
pollution. The design of environmental taxes in the long run may not only affect the 
intertemporal allocation but will have severe consequences on the international distribution of 
wealth as they affect the distribution of resource rents. A final section concludes.   3
2. THE DOUBLE-DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS: RECENT EXTENSIONS 
In the classical contribution about environmental taxation, Pigou (1920) has shown that an 
optimal tax on emissions has to be set equal to the marginal environmental damage (MED). 
Such a ‘Pigovian tax’ can ensure that polluters pay for the marginal social cost of their 
consumption of polluting goods completely. The concept of Pigovian taxation can be seen 















 Figure  2.1:  Pigovian tax 
In Figure 2.1 we consider the case of a polluting consumption good x.  ) (x MB  describes the 
marginal benefit of consumption, MCpriv the private marginal cost, and MCsoc the social 
marginal cost, respectively. Without environmental regulation, the competitive market 
outcome leads to an equalisation of private marginal costs and private marginal benefits. The 
market equilibrium is x0. The welfare loss in the equilibrium is equal to the area CDF as the 
marginal social cost MCsoc exceeds the marginal benefit of consumption MB for all units 
consumed in excess of  P x . Piecemeal extension of the dirty good consumption from zero to 
P x  however, increases welfare. Pareto optimality is achieved where the marginal private cost 
MCpriv plus the external cost MED equal the marginal benefit. [cf. e.g. Baumol and Oates 
(1988)]. 
The Pigovian tax  P t  can sustain the Pareto-efficient outcome. This tax leads to tax 
revenues equal to the area shaded in grey. These tax revenues may be used to reduce the 
excess burden of other taxes. According to the so-called weak form of the double-dividend   4
hypothesis,2 environmental taxes are expected not only to improve the quality of the 
environment but also to reduce the distortions of existing taxes on e.g. labour and capital 
income. This idea was first mentioned by Tullock (1967) and has been supported by partial 
equilibrium models in the eighties, developed by Nichols (1984), Terkla (1984) and Lee and 
Misiolek (1986). 
Based on the seminal paper by Sandmo (1975), however, this view has been 
questioned by several papers e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and van der 
Ploeg (1994a,b,c) and Goulder (1995) by looking at a somewhat different definition of a 
second dividend. According to their interpretation, a positive second dividend only exists if 
the excess burden of the total tax system – including the excess burden of the environmental 
tax – declines. E.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) conclude “that environmental taxes 
typically exacerbate, rather than alleviate, pre-existing distortions – even if revenues are 
employed to cut pre-existing distortionary taxes”. (p. 1085). Increasing a narrow-based green 
tax and reducing a broad-based tax like a tax on labour income will typically increase the 
overall distortion of the tax system. Hence, the second dividend is negative and the double-
dividend hypothesis fails. 
This section will present a model (Section 2.1) which allows us both to replicate the 
standard results of the double dividend literature and to show the validity of both 
interpretations (Section 2.2). The model is set up in more general way in order to analyse two 
important extensions recently made in the literature. Most of the standard results have been 
derived under the assumption that there is separability between consumption and the 
environment. As FitzRoy (1996) points out convincingly, environmental problems have to be 
considered as important when we observe people to protect themselves from the 
consequences of pollution. If this is the case, separability between consumption and 
environmental quality is too strong an assumption. It is necessary to explicitly take account of 
the interaction between pollution and consumption. As will be shown in Section 2.3, lower 
environmental taxes increase pollution and induce a higher level of the consumption of taxed 
defensive goods and therefore lower the welfare loss from taxation. 
Secondly, although already analysed in Sandmo (1975), the double dividend literature 
has somehow been neglecting redistributional objectives in determining optimal 
                                                 
2   For a definition of the weak and strong form of the double-dividend hypothesis cf. Goulder (1995).   5
environmental taxation.3 It has been frequently pointed out that equity considerations may 
change the structure of optimal taxes significantly. In particular, it has been shown that 
differentiated commodity taxes should be used to supplement the income tax as a 
redistributive device [cf. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)]. In an economy with externalities, 
distributional considerations may affect the optimal environmental tax in two ways. As some 
empirical studies indicate, environmental taxes may have a regressive nature because some 
environmentally harmful goods are largely consumed by low-income persons. In this case, the 
presence of redistributional objectives might lower the level of taxes on environmentally 
harmful commodities. Secondly, distributional considerations also influence the valuation of 
environmental damage. While the physical incidence of pollution is typically higher in the 
low-income groups, e.g. due to badly situated housing, well-off people tend to put a higher 
value on environmental quality [cf. Smith (1992), Harrison 1994)]. 
Section 2.4 analyses the consequences of taking account of redistributional objectives. 
The individual willingness to pay for environmental quality, summed up to derive the 
environmental damage, has to be weighted by the social weight given to the individuals in the 
social welfare function. The stronger society’s inequality aversion, the more heavily weighted 
are the valuations of the poor and, ceteris paribus, environmental taxes should therefore be  
larger the more pollution affects the poor. Following Pirttilä and Schöb (1999), this section 
derives the many-person Ramsey tax rule by allowing for environmental externalities, which 
arise from the consumption of an environmentally harmful good and discuss how 
environmental externalities influence the condition for the optimal tax structure. 
2.1 THE MODEL 
We consider a closed economy with H households with identical preferences but different 
income earning abilities. There are two private consumption goods c and d, a public good G 
and labour l. The private consumption good c is clean, i.e. its consumption has no external 
effect, whereas the private good d is dirty, i.e. its consumption creates negative external 
effects that cause the environmental quality E to deteriorate. The quantities demanded or 
supplied by household h are denoted by  l , , , d c i x
h
i = , the aggregate quantities of the 
consumption goods are denoted by Xc and Xd, respectively. 
                                                 
3  Exceptions are Johansson (1994) Mayeres and Proost (2001), Schöb (1995), Pirttilä and Schöb (1999) and 
Bulckaen and Stampini (2001).   6
There is a linear technology for the production of the private goods and the public 
good, with labour being the only input. Assuming perfect competition, we can choose units 
for all goods such that all producer prices are equal to one. As labour productivity differs 
between households, we denote the marginal productivity of each household’s labour by p
h
l. 
For the normalisation chosen, p
h
l also represents the wage rate for household h. The 
production possibilities are described by 
(2.1)   G X X x p d c
h
h h + + = ∑ l l . 
The government provides the public good G and grants each household a uniform lump-sum 
subsidy T (which might be negative). To finance its expenditures for a given amount of the 
public good, the government can levy taxes on the private commodities. The government’s 
budget constraint is therefore given by 
(2.2)   d d c c
h
h h X t X t x p t HT G + + = + ∑ l l l , 
where tc and td denote the commodity taxes on the clean good and the dirty good, respectively, 
and  l t  denotes the labour tax rate. As all private demands are homogeneous of degree zero in 
consumer prices, we are free to normalise one consumer price to unity, i.e. we can normalise 
one tax rate to zero. In what follows we will make use of different normalisations in order to 
derive and compare the standard results from the double dividend literature. 
Environmental quality E deteriorates due to polluting production or consumption. As 
the main emphasis of this paper is on the interaction of optimal environmental taxes with 
other forms of taxation, we restrict our analysis to the case of environmental externalities that 
are proportional to the quantity of a polluting commodity produced or consumed. The 
environmental quality is thus a decreasing function of the aggregate quantity of the dirty good 
Xd produced and consumed, i.e. 
(2.3)   E e Xd = () ,  0 ' < = d dX de e . 
The preferences of household h with respect to both the clean and dirty commodity, leisure 
x
h
0, the public good G, and the environmental quality E , can be represented by a twice 
continuously differentiable, strictly quasi-concave utility function   7





h h = , 
with , , , , , 0 , 0 E G d c i ui = >  denoting the marginal utility of good i. The time endowment is 
normalised to one, hence  1 0 = +
h h x x l . The budget constraint of the household is given by 




c c + − = + + + l l l) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (.  
As households differ in their earning abilities, represented by differences in the wage rate, 
households will also differ in their consumption patterns. When consuming the dirty good, the 
single household does not take account of the negative effect of its consumption on the 
environmental quality. 
The benevolent government maximises social welfare, represented by a Bergson-
Samuelson welfare function  
(2.6)   )) , , , , , ( ),..., , , , , , ( ), , , , , , ( (
2 1 E G T t t t v E G T t t t v E G T t t t v W W d c
H
d c d c l l l = , 
subject to its budget constraint (2.2). The term v
h refers to the indirect utility function of 
household h. The government can influence private utility, and hence social welfare by (i) 
varying the lump-sum transfer, (ii) imposing commodity taxes in general and (iii) determining 
the environmental quality E by imposing a particular environmental tax on the dirty good.4 
The Lagrangean of the government’s maximisation problem is therefore 
(2.7)   [] HT G X t X t X t v v v W d d c c
H − − + + µ + = l l ) ,..., , (
2 1 L . 
Denoting the private marginal valuation of income (the Lagrange multiplier of the individual 
household’s optimisation problem) by 
h λ , and using Roy’s identity, the first-order conditions 
are as follows (using the notation 
h
h
hx p X l l l ∑ = ): 
(2.8)  0
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4  The more general case where the government also maximises with respect to the public good provision is 
analysed in Schöb (1995) and Pirttilä (1998).   8
(2.9)  0
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The derivative of E with respect to a parameter  T t t t Z Z d c , , , , l = , can be calculated by total 
differentiation of equation (2.3): 
































where ) 0 (> ϕ  denotes the environmental feedback effect. The environmental feedback effect 
takes account of the fact that the quality of the environment may influence the demand for the 
dirty good. If a cleaner environment increases the consumption of the dirty good, ϕ  becomes 
smaller than unity. Peak load pricing e.g. will reduce traffic jams during the rush hour. Less 
traffic, however, will encourage more traffic.5 
2.2 OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAX WITHOUT DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this section we focus on the case with homogenous households and assume separability 
between private consumption and the environment E, and private consumption and the public 
good  G, respectively. Thus, all marginal rates of substitution between private goods are 
independent of E and G. There are H identical households whose preferences are represented 
by the same indirect utility function and the welfare function simplifies to 
(2.6a)   ) , , , , , ( E G T t t t Hv W d c l = . 
                                                 
5   Stability is guaranteed as long as the denominator of equation (2.12) is positive (cf. Schöb 1995, p. 118).   9
Welfare is maximised with respect to the government’s budget constraint (normalising  1 = p ) 
(2.2a)   () d d c c x t x t x t H HT G + + = + l l . 
The first-order conditions (2.8) to (2.11) have to be adjusted accordingly. If the government 
has unlimited access to lump-sum taxes  0 < T , the conditions  µ = λ  and  0 = = c t tl  establish 
a first-best solution where the government sets the environmental tax equal to the marginal 
















In a first-best world the government will set the optimal environmental tax equal to the 
Pigovian tax and will not apply any other distorting taxes. 
A LABOUR TAX SYSTEM 
If lump-sum taxation is not available, the government has to rely on distortive taxes to raise 
revenues. The second-best solution can be derived from the equation system (2.8) and (2.10) 
or the equation system (2.9) and (2.10), depending on the normalisation chosen. Following 
Schöb (1997) we describe the normalisation  0 = c t  as a labour tax system. For this 
normalisation and, following Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), the assumptions that the utility 
function is (i) separable between environmental quality, public good, leisure and consumption 
goods and (ii) homothetic in consumption goods, it would be optimal to have a labour tax but 
no commodity tax in the absence of environmental externalities. In the presence of external 
effects however, there will be an environmental tax in addition to the labour tax (see 
Appendix 1 for the relevant calculations for this section): 




For the case of an upward sloping labour supply curve, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) show 
that the second-best optimal environmental tax is lower than the first-best Pigovian tax. The 
intuition behind this result is, that increasing a narrow-based green tax and reducing a broad-
based tax like a tax on labour income will typically increase the overall distortion of the tax   10
system. To see this, consider the whole consumption bundle and its consumption price index. 
It is obvious that a reduction in the labour tax and a revenue-neutral increase of  d t  will not 
affect the real after-tax wage, if the household does not alter the composition of its 
consumption basket. However, if it substitutes the clean good for the dirty good, there will be 
a negative tax-base effect. Revenue-neutrality requires that the consumer price index will 
increase at a higher rate than the net-of-tax wage. As a consequence the real after-tax wage 
actually falls. Labour supply falls and welfare decreases. Since the Pigovian tax completely 
internalises the marginal environmental damage, the only effect of a marginal increase of the 
Pigovian tax is a higher marginal cost of public funds, i.e. a negative second dividend occurs. 
A COMMODITY TAX SYSTEM 
Things look different, however, if we normalise the net wage rate to unity, i.e.  0 = l t . Using 
the same assumptions made above, this would yield a commodity tax system with 
equiproportional tax rates in the absence of environmental externalities. In the presence of 
external effects, however, the tax on the dirty tax must be adjusted, 
(2.15)   P
R









d t  denotes the Ramsey tax component, which relies on the efficiency of the tax system 
only. From equation (2.15) it is no longer clear whether the tax on the dirty good lies above or 
below the Pigovian tax, even if the marginal utility of the public good exceeds marginal utility 
of the clean good as before.  
The two alternative optimal tax formulae (2.14) and (2.15) are the essence of an 
apparently ongoing controversy which has emerged in the literature about the magnitude of 
the second-best optimal tax on a polluting good: it seems to be unclear whether in second-best 
situations, characterised by distortionary taxes, optimal taxes on polluting goods should be 
higher or lower than the first-best Pigovian tax associated with the same allocation.6 
As this analysis, which followed the analysis of Schöb (1997) [also see Fullerton 
(1997)], has shown, the difference in the results concerning the optimal tax rate on a polluting 
good is due to different normalisations of tax rates which lead to different definitions of what 
the tax on a polluting good actually is. The controversy can be settled by looking at a second-
                                                 
6   Cf. e.g. Jaeger (1999).   11
best internalisation tax.7 In the presence of externalities, Pareto efficiency requires the 
equality of social and private marginal welfare of consuming a dirty good. In a first-best 
world, characterised by the feasibility of lump-sum taxes, this can be achieved by imposing a 
tax on a polluting good that equals the marginal environmental damage. Such a Pigovian tax 
fully internalises the external costs at the margin. In a second-best world we can apply the 
concept of internalising externalities in a similar way by looking for a tax rate 
E
d t  on the dirty 
good which would exactly internalise the external effect of this dirty good. 
To derive such a tax rate, let us assume that one of the H households obtains an 
additional marginal unit of exogenous income Y. In the household optimum the household is 
indifferent to how to spend this additional income. Without loss of generality we can therefore 
assume that the household increases the consumption of d only, i.e. by 11 () + td
E  and that the 





































The first term of the right-hand side denotes the increase in private utility while the second 
term denotes the external effect imposed on all households by the additional consumption of 
the dirty good d. The last term is the increase in all households’ utility due to the additional 
provision of the public good G which is financed by the internalisation tax imposed on the 
dirty good d. 
Full internalisation requires that the private marginal utility of consuming the dirty 
good, which is  ) 1 (
E
d d t x u dY du + ∂ ∂ = , is equal to the social marginal welfare (2.16) of 
consuming the dirty good. From this identity, it follows that the external effect is exactly 

















                                                 
7   See Orosel and Schöb (1996) for the following.   12
which is identical to the tax rate (2.13) and the second component of the tax rate (2.15). This 
is the tax component of the total tax on the dirty good d that the government has to impose in 
order to exactly internalise the external effect. An important property of this second-best 
internalisation tax td
E as defined in (2.17), is that it depends only on the real variables uE, uG 
and ' e  and thus is itself a real variable. Therefore, although the tax rates themselves can be 
arbitrarily normalised, the second-best internalisation tax td
E is given independently of the 
normalisation. It will not be affected by any change of this normalisation. Empirically, this 
component is smaller than the Pigovian tax. Parry (1995) estimates that it is only between 
63% and 78% of the marginal environmental damage. 
The concept of the second-best internalisation tax allows us to reinterpret the two tax 
formulae (2.14) and (2.15). From the labour tax system we can learn that the scope for 
environmental policy is smaller compared to the scope in a first-best world because, due to 
distortionary taxation, the environmental quality is already closer to the second-best optimum 
than the laissez-faire situation in a non-distorted economy. From adding the second-best 
internalisation tax in a commodity tax system we learn that the total tax borne by the dirty 
good (in units of leisure) can – and normally will – be higher than the Pigovian tax. As the 
total effective tax on the dirty good exceeds the Pigovian tax, one could expect that the 
environmental quality is better in a second-best than in a first-best world. Indeed, it is maybe 
the most important insight that environmental policies which raise public revenues are 
superior to policies that leave the rent created by restrictions on pollution in the private sector 
(cf. Schöb 1996). Achieving a given environmental level would impose the same effects on 
the consumption of taxed goods as the tax-interaction effect describes for achieving the goal 
by levying green taxes. However, the green taxes have, unlike e.g. grandfathered permits, the 
advantage of generating a revenue-recycling effect, which partly offset the tax-interaction 
effect. This result has been confirmed by a series of numerical general equilibrium models 
recently.8 The conclusion of Parry, Williams and Goulder (1999) with respect to carbon 
abatement policies can easily be generalised: “Carbon taxes, as well as carbon quotas or 
tradable permits that are auctioned by the government, enjoy the revenue-recycling effect as 
long as the revenues obtained are used to finance cuts in marginal tax rates of distortionary 
taxes such as the income tax. In contrast, grandfathered (non-auctioned) carbon quotas and 
permits fail to raise revenues and thus cannot exploit the revenue-recycling effect. ... the   13
inability to make use of the revenue-recycling effect can put the latter policies at a substantial 
efficiency disadvantage relative to the former policies” (p. 53).9 
The literature also shows that in second-best economies the abatement cost exceeds 
the abatement cost economies would face in a first-best world. Assuming increasing marginal 
abatement cost, this suggests that the environmental quality in a second-best world is better 
than in a first-best world – a result confirmed recently by Metcalf (2003) who shows that 
increasing the public expenditure requirement improves the environment in most plausible 
cases. 
The discussion about the normalisation is also very helpful to discuss the case where 
the dirty good may not be taxable at all. Fullerton and Wolverton (2003) argue that many 
types of pollution are difficult to monitor or, when measurement of pollution is possible, 
enforcing a green tax may not be feasible. For instance, emissions of cars cannot be measured 
directly and the impact of emissions may differ widely depending on whether the car emits 
pollutants in densely populated areas or on the country side or, with respect to noise, whether 
one drives during rush hour or during night time through town. Fullerton and Wolverton 
(2003) show that it taxation of the dirty good is restricted,  0 = d t , a two-part instrument that 
consists of a combination of a higher labour tax and a subsidy on the clean good can achieve 
the same allocation as either the labour tax system or the commodity tax system where we 
have a direct tax on the dirty good in effect.  
2.3 HOMOGENOUS HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-SEPARABILITY 
As pointed out by FitzRoy (1996), severe environmental problems make it likely that a 
significant proportion of the consumption is spent on defensive goods, i.e. goods which are 
used to reduce the disutility derived from pollution. Thus, if we allow for such behavior and 
assume non-separability between consumption goods and environmental quality, the optimal 
tax formula of the dirty good for the case of a commodity tax system becomes (cf. Appendix 
1):  
                                                                                                                                                          
8  Cf. Goulder, Parry and Burtraw (1997), Goulder, Parry, Williams and Burtraw (1999), Parry, Williams and 
Goulder (1999). 
9  Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) have pointed out, however, that it is not necessary that the government raises 
revenues from environmental policy. Essential is that the government can capture the rents generated by the 
environmental policy.   14
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In condition (2.15a) the reaction of household is reflected by an aggregate substitutability 
between the taxed commodities and the environmental quality, i.e.  tH x E ii ∂∂ ∑ > 0. In this 
case, a higher tax on the dirty good will reduce both pollution and tax revenues as the need for 
taxed defensive goods will be reduced when environmental quality increases. Put it 
differently: in the presence of defensive goods which are taxed, the social cost of pollution is 
lower as the marginal environmental damage is partly compensated by higher tax revenues 
due to a higher demand for defensive goods. 
If, for instance, the price elasticity of a defensive good is low, according to the 
Ramsey rule it should be taxed at a relatively high rate. If, by contrast, the elasticity with 
respect to pollution is high, a marginal increase of the environmental tax would lead to a large 
decrease in tax revenues. In this extreme case, it cannot be ruled out that the tax revenues 
decrease rather than increase as a consequence of an increase in the environmental tax.10  
PROPOSITION 2.1 (Optimal environmental tax and defensive goods): In the presence of 
defensive goods, in the sense that there is aggregate substitutability between taxed 
consumption goods and the environmental quality, the optimal tax on the dirty good 
should ceteris paribus be lower than in the case with separability between consumption 
goods and the environment. 
Schwartz and Repetto (2000), by contrast, show that if labour supply is positively affected by 
an improvement of environmental quality, increasing rather than decreasing environmental 
quality will yield an additional positive tax-interaction effect. A positive tax interaction effect 
would lead to a higher tax on the dirty good. 
2.4 HETEROGENEOUS HOUSEHOLDS 
To analyse the case of heterogenous households, we restrict the analysis to the case where the 
labour tax rate is normalised to zero and assume again separability between private 
consumption and the environment E, and private consumption and the public good G, 
respectively. This implies that the environmental quality has the same physical impact on all 
households, independently of their earning abilities and their consumption pattern. In this   15
case, the environmental feed back effect ϕ  [cf. (2.12)], reduces to unity and the demand for 
the dirty good becomes independent of the environmental quality (cf. Pirttilä and Schöb 
(1999) for the following). 
To derive optimal tax rules for heterogeneous households, it is convenient to introduce 
the definition of the gross social marginal valuation of household h’s income, measured in 
terms of government’s revenue by 










If the government is interested in redistributing income from high ability households to low 
ability households, the social welfare function (2.6) will be strictly quasi-concave, i.e. 
h v W ∂ ∂  is larger the lower v
h is. As private utility is also strictly quasi-concave, λ
h 
decreases in utility. Hence, β
h is negatively correlated with the earning ability and the 
household’s utility level, respectively. 
The individual evaluation of the additional environmental damage may differ between 
individuals as the marginal valuation of the environment normally does not change 
proportionately with the marginal utility of income λ
h. The marginal willingness to pay for 
environmental quality is therefore defined as 








Applying the separability assumption, and using the definitions (2.18) and (2.19) in the first-
order conditions, and using Cramer’s rule, we can solve equations (2.9) and (2.10) for the 
optimal commodity tax rate of the clean and the dirty good, respectively. Denoting the 
determinant of the Jacobian matrix for the case of heterogenous households as  J ˆ , the optimal 
tax formulae are: 



































                                                                                                                                                          
10 Note that the existence of defensive goods would also reduce the marginal environmental damage.   16





































Equations (2.20) and (2.21) show the result derived by Sandmo (1975). The external effect 
does not enter the optimal tax formula for the clean good even if distributional objectives are 
taken into account. It only enters the optimal tax formula for the dirty good additively. This 
environmental component of the optimal tax on the dirty good may be considered as the price 
the consumer of the dirty good has to pay in a second-best world in order to completely 
internalise the external effect. 
To see this, consider the following thought experiment which is related to the 
interpretation of the second-best internalisation tax in the last section for the model with 
identical households. We abstract from all other taxes and focus on the environmental tax 
component alone which we define as td
E. Assume that a household h receives an additional 
marginal unit of exogenous income 
h Y . In the household optimum, the household’s utility 
increases by 
h λ , independently of how it spends the additional income. Hence, without loss of 
generality, we assume that the household increases the consumption of d only, i.e. by 
) 1 ( 1
E
d t + . The effect of a marginal increase in household h’s income on social welfare is 





























































The first term of the right-hand side denotes the increase in the gross social marginal 
valuation of household h’s private utility 
h β  [cf. equation (2.18)]. The second term denotes 
the social marginal external effect imposed on all households by the additional consumption 
of the dirty good d [cf. equation (2.19)]. The last term shows the increase in public revenues 
from the internalisation tax imposed on the dirty good d. (It is assumed that additional tax 
revenues are used to increase public good provision.) 
Full internalisation requires that, from the viewpoint of society, the social marginal 
utility of the private consumption of the dirty good, i.e. the gross social marginal valuation 
h β , should be equal to social marginal welfare of consuming the dirty good:   17
µ = β
h h dY dW . Hence, the external effect is exactly internalised if and only if the tax on 
the dirty good is equal to 
(2.23)   te d
Eh h
h
=− ∑βω ', 
which forms the environmental component of td  in equation (2.21). The term ω
he' denotes 
the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in emissions times the amount of emissions 
caused by a marginal increase in the dirty good consumption. In order to derive the social 
evaluation of pollution, the household’s marginal willingness to pay has to be weighted with 
the social weight β
h given to the household. 
THE MANY-PERSON RAMSEY TAX RULE WITH EXTERNALITIES 
Diamond (1975) presents a procedure for interpreting commodity taxation rules when income 
can be taxed on a linear scale. This section refers to Diamond’s approach to deriving a many-
person Ramsey tax rule, and demonstrates how his model has to be modified to allow for the 
presence of externalities. Therefore, we first redefine the net social marginal valuation of 
household  h’s income, denoted by γ
h , by taking into account the influence private 
consumption has on the external effect: 
(2.24)   ∑∑
= ∂
∂ ′ ω β +
∂
∂
















Definition (2.24) is identical with Diamond’s definition [see his equation (6)], except for the 
last term of the right-hand side. The net social marginal valuation of household h’s income 
includes, first of all, the gross marginal social valuation of income β
h which represents the 
social evaluation of the marginal utility household h derives from a marginal increase in 
income. The social value of an extra income to household h also depends on the influence the 
additional income has on tax revenues. This effect is captured by the second term of the right-
hand side of equation (2.24). If the extra income increases the demand for taxed goods by 
household h, tax revenues also increase and may be used e.g. to increase the provision of the 
public good. In this case, the net social marginal valuation exceeds the gross social valuation 
of income. 
In the presence of externalities, the net social valuation of income also depends on the 
impact the additional income has on environmental quality. This effect is covered by the last   18
term on the right-hand side. If the extra income increases the household h’s consumption of 
the dirty good, the value of the additional damage caused by it to all members of the economy 
has to be deducted from the social valuation of income. If the dirty good is a normal good, the 
externality-augmented net social valuation of income will therefore be lower than Diamond’s 
(1975) definition suggests. 
Using the definition of γ








i ∂ ∂ ⋅ − = ∂ ∂ , 
where si
h  denotes the compensated (cross-) price effect, and Slutsky-symmetry, the first-order 
conditions for  d c j t j , , =  can be rewritten in the following way: 
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with  jc d = , . In the absence of externalities, i.e. for e'= 0, equation (2.25) restates Diamond’s 
(1975) result [cf. his equation (7)]. The new second term on the right-hand side takes account 
of the externality. In order to interpret equation (2.25), however, we will further simplify this 
condition. Substituting definition (2.24) into the first-order condition for the lump-sum 
transfer, equation (2.11), we obtain: 






























where  γ  denotes the average net social valuation of income over all households. Equation 
(2.26) states that in an optimum, the average valuation of a transfer of one unit of money 
should be equal to its cost, which is equal to unity. 
Next, we define the normalised covariance between the net social evaluation of private 
income and the consumption of good j, 














(cf. e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). The first term of the right-hand side is known as the 
distributional characteristic of good i (cf. Feldstein 1972). If the government is indifferent to 
which household the extra income is given, all γ
h are identical to γ , and the normalised 
covariance expression reduces to zero. With inequality aversion, γ
h is larger for low-income   19
households, provided that the additional tax revenue and the externality term in definition of 
γ
h [cf. (2.24)] do not have too strong countervailing effects.11 This implies that the 
distributional characteristics of a good, of which low-income households demand a large 
proportion, takes a value greater than unity, because the relative consumption of that good by 
household h increases with γ
h. According to Rose and Wiegard (1983), the distributional 
characteristics of a good i can be interpreted as a measure of society’s willingness to pay for a 
more equal distribution of income. 


































with  jc d = , . The term ε jd
h  denotes the compensated cross-price elasticity of good j with 
respect to the price of the dirty good d. The left-hand side equals the relative change of the 
compensated demand if all tax rates change proportionately. To see this, consider the total 
differential of the compensated demand function xttujc d j
h
cd (,,) , , =  for a small 
equiproportionate change of all tax rates, i.e.  d c i t dt i i , , = α = :12 












Summing up over all households and dividing by the total demand, we obtain the relative 


















                                                 
11 The gross social valuation of income is always larger for low-income households than for well-off 
households. This need not be the case for the net measure, because additional income may lead to larger 
changes in the demand for the taxed commodities among the high-income households, in which case γ
h 
would increase. It is also hard to deduce whether the magnitude of the externality-encompassing term is 
greater or smaller for worse-off households and, accordingly, in which direction the differences in the net 
social valuation move. 
12 Note that we have assumed separability between consumption and environmental quality.   20
The left-hand side of equation (2.28) therefore explains how the relative change in the 
demand of good j, due to a small equiproportionate change of all tax rates, is determined. To 
interpret the right-hand side carefully, consider first the case without external effects (i.e. 
e'= 0). In this case, the externality-based term disappears from the first-order condition and 
from the definition of γ
h, respectively. Optimal commodity taxation is determined by the 
normalised covariance alone. 
If, on the other hand, redistribution is not an issue, and there are no external effects, 
the normalised covariance term vanishes. In this case, there would be no commodity taxation 
in the optimum. Tax revenues would be raised by imposing a uniform lump-sum tax () T < 0  
only. With inequality aversion, however, the aggregate compensated change in demand of 
good j should be smaller, the lower the values of the normalized covariance Φ j is. The 
normalised covariance rule therefore advises the government to subsidise the consumption of 
goods which are largely demanded by those people with a large net social marginal valuation 
of income, i.e. the poor people and discourage the consumption of luxury goods consumed by 
rich households with low 
h y . In this way commodity taxation is used for redistributional 
purposes. 
If external effects are present, but society is not interested in redistribution, the 
aggregate compensated change in the demand of taxed goods is determined solely by the 
externality term. This term depends on the compensated elasticity between the taxed good and 
the dirty good. The compensated own-price elasticity of the dirty good, and hence the 
aggregate compensated change in the demand for the dirty good, will be negative. This impact 
arises naturally from the fact that, as the consumption of good d worsens the environmental 
quality, it is in the society’s interest to reduce its consumption. For the clean good, the 
compensated change in demand should be smaller, the higher the compensated 
complementarity relationship between the taxed good and the dirty good is (the more negative 
the compensated elasticity is). Proposition 2.2 summarises. 
PROPOSITION 2.2 (The many-person Ramsey tax rule in the presence of externalities): 
If commodity taxes and the uniform lump-sum transfer are set optimally, a small 
equiproportional increase in all tax rates will cause all compensated commodity 
demands to change according to their distributional characteristics. In addition, the 
decline (increase) in the compensated demand for the taxed good will be larger   21
(smaller), the stronger the complementarity relationship between the taxed good and 
the dirty good is.13 
It is important to note that, with an equiproportional change in all tax rates, we change the 
level of the Pigovian tax component by the same amount as the Ramsey tax component. 
Hence, the tax on the dirty good increases at a larger rate than the standard many-person 
Ramsey tax rule suggests in the absence of externalities. Consequently, the demand for all 
complements will fall at a larger rate while the demand for substitutes will fall at a lower rate. 
This is the mechanism which makes the complementarity relationship between taxed goods 
and the dirty good enter the tax rule. A comparison with Sandmo’s additivity property shows 
that Proposition 2.2 does not imply that goods which are complements to the dirty good 
should be taxed more strongly. Rather, the conclusion suggests that their consumption is 
reduced because of the indirect impact the relatively larger change of the tax on the dirty good 
has on their demand. 
This result also shows that, apart from the redistributional characteristics of the 
particular commodity, the optimal tax rule also depends on redistributional concerns because 
of the social valuation of environmental damage. The private disutility of a marginal increase 
in pollution is weighted by the gross social valuation of household h’s income β
h. This means 
that the marginal willingness to pay for the environmental quality by a low-income household 
has a relatively high impact on the social valuation of the environment and on the externality-
based term in the tax rules as well. Moreover, as the magnitude of β
h decreases with the 
shadow price of public funds µ , we can deduce that the externality-based part in the tax 
conditions decreases with rising µ . The reason is that, as the burden of public funds rises, it 
becomes more and more expensive to internalise externalities. 
In brief, the modified many-person Ramsey tax rule reveals that the influence of 
commodity taxation on the demand for taxed goods depends on both redistributional and 
environmental objectives. If the worse-off households have a relatively large demand for the 
environmentally harmful good, as some empirical studies suggest, then the optimal tax rule 
proposes that the income distribution part of taxation lowers the tax on the dirty good. This 
tax would otherwise be high in order to internalise the negative external impact. Therefore, 
                                                 
13  Pirttilä and Schöb (1999) derive another alternative many-person Ramsey tax rule in the presence of 
externalities not presented here: If commodity taxes and the lump-sum transfer are set optimally, a small   22
without any further restrictions on consumers’ preferences, efficiency and equity 
considerations cannot be separated when making decisions concerning the level of 
environmental taxes. This confirms Sandmo’s (2000) statement that the distributional 
concerns cannot be ignored in the study of externalities within public finance models. 
This discussion can be connected to the double-dividend debate reviewed in Section 
2.2. Although the formulation containing the change in the compensated demand does not 
provide an explicit tax rule, it still implies that if the harmful goods are in relatively great 
demand by the low-income households, the non-environmental tax component should be low 
– or even negative – because, in the absence of externalities, differentiated commodity 
taxation is only used to influence income distribution, and a reduction in the tax rate of a good 
is a direct way to increase its compensated demand. 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This section reviewed the standard results of the double-dividend literature and discussed 
some of the more recent extensions. As has been shown, the question whether an 
environmental tax should be larger or smaller than a Pigovian tax is best be addressed by 
looking at the second-best internalisation tax. This tax component will fall short of the 
Pigovian tax if the government has to rely on distortionary taxes. Allowing for non-
separability is a necessary extension which has to be made if environmental problems are or 
any significant relevance. Optimal environmental tax rates may be lower in the presence of 
defensive goods but higher, if improved environmental quality has e.g. a positive effect on 
labour supply. The government’s concern of both efficiency and equity also requires some 
modifications of the optimal second-best tax system. The government should not only impose 
high taxes on goods that are largely consumed by well-off households. The many-person 
Ramsey tax rule in the presence of externalities shows that this rule has to be adjusted by 
imposing an additional environmental tax on the dirty good so that the compensated change in 
the demand of a taxed good due to a small equiproportional change in all tax rates is smaller, 
the higher the compensated complementarity between the taxed good and the dirty good is. 
This is because an increase of the environmental tax component reduces the demand for 
goods which are complements for the dirty good while it increases the demand for all goods 
which are substitutes. 
                                                                                                                                                          
equiproportional increase in all Ramsey tax components will cause all compensated commodity demands to 
change according to their distributional characteristics.   23
3.  EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE EFFECTS IN THE PRESENCE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Do green tax reforms boost employment? This question provoked the search for another 
second dividend of environmental tax reform: the employment dividend. Though the concept 
of an environmental dividend is meaningless for countries with functioning labour markets 
and hence full employment, it has become the most important concept in the political debate 
about green tax reforms in the European countries suffering from persistently high levels of 
unemployment. 
One obvious way to reduce employment by raising environmental taxes is by 
recycling the resulting tax revenues through cuts in labour taxes. The high levels of taxes on 
labour income, combined with the high level of unemployment benefits, are often made 
responsible for unemployment since it distorts labour supply and increases wage pressure in 
labour markets (see OECD 1995). A green tax reform may alleviate the tax burden on labour 
and hence reduce the resulting disincentives. 
To show this, one has to analyse the tax incidence of both the green tax and the labour 
tax in the presence of labour market imperfections. Indeed, many papers dealing with 
environmental tax reforms in the presence of involuntary unemployment discovered an 
environmental dividend. In a model with fixed net-of-tax wages, Bovenberg and van der 
Ploeg (1996, 1998a) show that if green taxes are low initially, employment may increase if 
substitution between labour and resources within the production sector is easy. Bovenberg 
and van der Ploeg (1998b), using a search theoretic framework, found a positive employment 
effect for a revenue-neutral green tax reform which both increases the tax on a polluting factor 
of production and succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from labour income to transfer 
income. In an efficiency wage model, Schneider (1997) also shows that employment may 
increase due to an increase in green taxes.14 Koskela and Schöb (1999) apply a model with 
endogenous wage negotiations between trade unions and firms. Using the right-to-manage 
approach [cf. Nickell and Andrews (1983)], they elaborate different institutional settings and 
their importance for the employment effect. Their main finding is that if unemployment 
benefits are nominally fixed and are taxed at a lower rate than wage income, a revenue-neutral 
green tax reform which increases green taxes on the consumption of a polluting good 
alleviates unemployment. Holmlund and Kolm (2000) examine the role of an environmental 
                                                 
14 Also see the comment by Scholz (1998).   24
tax reform for a small open economy with monopolistic competition. They show for a Cobb-
Douglas technology and a two sector economy that a revenue-neutral green tax reform boosts 
employment if wages in the tradable sector are higher than in the non-traded sector. Koskela, 
Schöb and Sinn (1998) show that if the net-of-tax wage rate does not react to tax rate changes 
the environmental taxes in the production sector should exceed the labour tax rate. Their 
analysis suggests that a green tax reform can provide a free lunch even when there are no 
environmental externalities. In a bargaining model where the firm can invest in abatement 
technologies, Strand (1999) shows that rebating green tax revenues by either subsidising 
either firms’ hiring or investments in abatement, pollution declines whilee employment may 
increase thus creating a double dividend. 
Brunello (1996) and Carraro, Galeotti and Gallo (1996) are pessimistic about the long-
run effects of a green tax reform. Modelling the outside option of the trade union as a 
weighted average of unemployment benefit payments and wage income from being employed 
elsewhere[cf. Layard, Nickell and Jackman [(1990, 1991)], they show that in the long run, the 
trade union succeeds in raising the net-of-tax wage rate at the same amount the labour tax rate 
is reduced, thus eliminating the short run employment dividend. Carraro, Galeotti and Gallo 
(1996) provide numerical simulations of the effects of a carbon tax reform in a bargaining 
model, which indicate some evidence in favour of a short-run employment dividend but not in 
the long-run.15 
In this section the effects of green taxes in the production sector are analysed in a 
model related to the framework developed by Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998). In their model 
the wage is endogenously determined in a bargaining process between trade unions and a 
firm. The firm produces with two factors of production and faces a downward sloping demand 
for its good. The wage negotiations are analysed using a ‘right-to-manage’ model by allowing 
non-constant elasticities of factor demands. Trade unions and firms bargain over wages and 
firms then choose the employment level that maximises profits. While the focus of Koskela, 
Schöb and Sinn (1998) was on tax reform, the focus here is on optimal tax formulae, in order 
to provide a comparison with the analysis of Section 2. 
Section 3.1 sets up the model. Section 3.2 provides the main intuition why a green tax 
reform can reap a second employment dividend. Section 3.3 then derives the optimal tax 
                                                 
15 See Bosello, Carraro and Galeotti (2001) for further references.   25
formulae and discusses how they depend on the magnitude of the labour market distortion and 
the availability of non-distorting profit taxes. Section 3.4 summarises this section. 
3.1 THE MODEL 
We consider a small open economy that satisfies the usual resource constraint 
(3.1)   M pY G C I − + + = , 
where  Y G C I , , ,  and M denote domestic income, private consumption, public consumption, 
exports, and imports. The price of export goods Y in terms of a produced import good which 
serves for public and private consumption is denoted by p, which we will identify with the 
economy’s “terms of trade”. The other import good R, a natural resource, called “energy”, is 
available at a given price q, again defined in terms of the imported consumption good, so that 
M C G qR =++ . 
Domestic production is represented by a single monopolistic firm which produces 
good  Y with energy R and labour L as inputs. While energy R is imported, labour L is 
internationally immobile. Technology is assumed to be linear-homogeneous and is 
represented by a constant elasticity of substitution production function  ) , ( R L f Y = .  The 
monopolistic firm faces world output demand D p ( ), which is decreasing in the output price p 
and is assumed to be iso-elastic, i.e. YD p p ==
− ()
ε , with () ε∂ ≡− ⋅ Dp p pY ( )  denoting the 
output demand elasticity. The closer substitutes for good Y on the world market are, the more 
elastic output demand becomes. 
The firm maximises profits, which are given by  L w R q Y Y p ~ ~ ) ( − − = π , where the firm 
considers the gross energy price q ~ and the gross wage rate w ~  as given. The gross wage is the 
net-of-tax wage, which is negotiated between a trade union and the firm, plus the labour tax, 
modelled as a payroll tax:  w t w w) 1 ( ~ + = . The energy price is the foreign resource price plus a 
green tax levied on the use of energy in production:  q t q q) 1 ( ~ + = . To guarantee a profit 
maximum, the output demand elasticity must exceed unity, i.e. ε> 1, in which case profit 
maximisation implies that the firm will set a price which exceeds the constant marginal cost 
) ~ , ~ ( q w c  by a constant mark-up factor εε () −> 11 .   26
All  N workers of the economy are represented by a single trade union which 
maximises its N members’ net-of-tax income.16 Each member of the trade union supplies one 
unit of labour if employed, or zero labour if unemployed. The earning of a member thus 
equals the net-of-tax wage rate w if employed. If he is unemployed the trade union member 
has an outside option b which depends on the utility derived from leisure and the 
unemployment benefit transfers from the government. The objective function of the trade 
union is hence given by 
(3.2)   ) (
* L N b wL V − + = . 
The wage rate is determined in a bargaining process between the trade union and the firm. 
After the net-of-tax wage rate is fixed, the firm then unilaterally determines employment. This 
is modelled by using a ‘right-to manage’ model which represents the outcome of the 
bargaining by an asymmetric Nash bargaining. The fall-back position of the trade union is 
given by V bN
0 = , i.e. if the negotiations break down, all members receive their reservation 
wage equal to the outside option. The fall-back position of the firm is given by zero profits, 
i.e. π
0 0 = . Using V V V ≡−
*0 , the Nash bargaining maximand can be written as 
(3.3)  
β − β π = Ω
1 V , 
with  β  representing the bargaining power of the trade union. Using a CES production 
technology we will apply the explicit formulation of the wage elasticity of labour demand, 
) ( ~
~ ~ , ε − σ + σ − = ≡ η s L w Lw w L , with σ  being the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
energy and  cY L w s ~ =  being the cost share of labour (cf. Koskela and Schöb 2002b). The 
first-order condition with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate is 
(3.4)   ( ) 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 0 ~ , = β + ε − β − + βη − ⇔ = Ω w s b w w L w . 
Equation (3.4) implicitly determines the negotiated net-of-tax wage from Nash bargaining as a 
function of the tax policy parameters tw and tq so that we have  ) , ( q w t t w w = . 
To derive the optimal tax formulae for an economy where the nominal wage is 
determined in wage negotiations, we have first to know how wage negotiations are affected 
by the tax system. The effect of a change in the labour tax rate on the net-of-tax wage rate is 
                                                 
16 Note that although we assume a single trade union in the economy it behaves like a small trade union as its   27
(3.5)  















− = , 
with  s y w L ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ~ , ε − β − + η + β =  and  [] w s z ~ ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ε − β − + ε − σ β = . As the second-order 
condition is assumed to hold throughout, i.e.  0 ) 1 ( ) ( < + − + = Ω w ww t z b w y , we can infer that 
) ( sign ) ( sign ) ( sign ~ w t s z w
w − = =  if labour and energy are price complements  ε < σ , as we will 
assume in what follows. (Note that  1 > ε ). For a CES production technology, the partial 
derivative of the cost share of labour with respect to the gross wage rate is given by 










































w t w . 
If the elasticity of substitution σ  is less than one, an increase in the labour tax rate will lead to 
an increase in the cost share of labour s. A larger share s implies that the wage elasticity of 
labour demand is higher in absolute terms. Hence, the trade union benefits less from 
demanding higher wages and the net-of-tax wage rate falls. By contrast, when the elasticity of 
substitution exceeds one, the cost share of labour s decreases due to higher labour taxes, so 
that the wage elasticity of labour demand is lower in absolute terms. The trade union benefits 
more from demanding higher wages and the net-of-tax wage increases. In the case of Cobb-
Douglas production function with the elasticity of substitution being one, the wage elasticity 
is constant so that factor taxes will have no effect on the negotiated net-of-tax wage. 
An exogenous increase in the green tax rate has an effect on the cost share of labour 
opposite to that of the increase in the labour tax rate. Hence, depending on the elasticity of 












q t w . 
                                                                                                                                                          
policy cannot affect the consumer price level.   28
The interpretation of (3.7) is analogous to that presented for the labour tax rate. 
Finally, the government requires a fixed amount of tax revenues to finance the public 
good G.17 The government levies the labour tax tw  on wage income and a source-based tax on 
energy input  q t . In addition there is might be a profit tax tπ  on domestic profits so that the 
government budget constraint is given by 
(3.8)   G t qR t wL t q w = π + + π . 
To focus on efficiency aspects of the optimal tax structure only, we assume linear preferences 
and thereby consider the total surplus as an appropriate social planner’s objective function [cf. 
Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993)]. The total surplus consists of the wage income equal to 
wL, which accrues to workers,  ) ( L N b − , the money metric-utility unemployed derive from 
leisure, and the net-of-tax profit income  π − π ) 1 ( t . As we keep G constant throughout the 
analysis, we can suppress the term G in the welfare function. As all energy is imported, 
private income from energy sales does not appear in the welfare function. All domestic profits 
go to domestic capitalists. Finally, the monetarised value of the environment is given by 
) (R E , with  0 < R E , which enters the welfare function separately. Hence, the welfare function 
is given by 
(3.9)   ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( R E t L N b wL S + π − + − + = π . 
3.2 LABOUR TAX SYSTEM VS GREEN TAX SYSTEM 
Let us begin our analysis by asking whether there might be a reason for introducing a “green 
tax system”, characterised by relatively high tax rates on energy and relatively low labour 
taxes, which yields the same output as the existing “labour tax system” where the labour tax 
rate exceeds the energy tax rate, but generates a higher level of employment. 18 For the sake of 
the argument we keep the net-of-tax wage w constant. 
Such a green tax system must satisfy several conditions. Profit maximisation requires 
that the same output  f L R Y (,) = 0, where the output level Y0 is ceteris paribus determined by 
                                                 
17 For the sake of the argument, we assume that there are no unemployment benefit payments paid by the 
government. This assumption does not affect the qualitative results so it does affect the magnitude of the 
actual optimal tax formulae. 
18 This section replicates a thought experiment by Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998).   29
the initial tax rates tw
A and tq
A, is produced with minimum cost. The first-order condition for 
cost-minimisation can be represented by  0 ) , ( ~ ) , ( ~ = − R L f q R L f w L R , where  fi denotes the 
partial derivative of  f L R (,)  with respect to i L R = ,  (e.g.  f f R R =∂ ∂ ). Furthermore, the 
marginal cost must be equal in the two systems, for otherwise the firm would not sell the 
same output in equilibrium as before. With linear-homogenous technologies this implies 
constant total cost,  0
~ ~ C R q L w = + . Finally, the government budget constraint (3.8) must be 
met. 
These conditions provide an equation system which can be solved with respect to the 
optimal inputs and the necessary tax rates, respectively. Instead of solving the system 
analytically, the solution is represented in Figure 3.1. In the profit maximum, the slope of the 
isoquant  0 Y  equals the negative of the ratio of the tax-inclusive factor prices  w q ~ ~ − . In the 
initial equilibrium A we observe the factor price ratio −+ + () () 11 tq tw q
A
w
A  with tt w
A
q
A > . 
Since A is a point of tangency between the isocost and the isoquant, it characterises a cost 
minimum. Given q, w,  tq
A,  tw
A, there are many such cost minima on a ray from the origin 
through A all of which have the same unit production cost, but because of the endogeneity of 
the output price, there is only one point that maximises profits: point A that shall indicate the 




The isocost through A reflects the factor cost including the burden of factor taxes. 
Figure 3.1 also shows the corresponding net-of-tax isocost curve. This curve is defined as the 
geometrical locus of factor combinations that would be attainable at a given expense if there 








w t t . 
The horizontal distance between A and the net-of-tax isocost equals the government’s 
tax revenue in terms of R. The broken parallel to the net-of-tax isocost through A thus defines 
the geometrical locus of all potential equilibria, where tax revenue and net-of-tax factor 
expenses are the same as in the labour-tax regime A.   30
 
  Figure 3.1: Labour tax system versus green tax system 
It is now possible, with an appropriate choice of the tax rates tw and tq, to transpose the 
economy from A to B, keeping output, tax-inclusive factor expenses and unit production cost 
constant while preserving the conditions for a cost minimum. Since neither the unit 
production cost nor the output price alter with this transposition, B is an equilibrium. Point B 
indicates a green tax system ( , ) tt w
B
q
B  with tt q
B
w
B >  that yields the same output at the same total 
cost. Moving from A to B will instantaneously increase employment, L L
BA > , without 
imposing any additional cost on either firm or government. In addition, less energy will be 
used, R R
BA < , and, consequently, the environment will improve (remember:  0 < R E ). 
This thought experiment shows that with given net-of-tax factor prices and a linear-
homogenous production technology, there exists a green tax system with higher tax rates on 
energy than on labour which yields both the same output level and same tax revenues as the 
existing labour tax system where the labour tax rate exceeds the energy tax rate. The green tax 
system generates both a higher level of employment and a cleaner environment thus reaping a 
double dividend. As profits are unchanged, and welfare is increasing in both employment and 
environmental quality, welfare will be higher in the green tax system than in the labour tax 
system. 
3.3 WELFARE MAXIMISATION: THE OPTIMAL TAX FORMULAE 
Now we turn to the welfare maximisation problem where the government chooses tax rates 
first and the labour organisations then determine the wage rate in a wage negotiation, taking 
the tax rates as given. Hence, the government maximises the total surplus (3.9) subject to the   31
budget constraint of the government (3.8), the outcome of the wage negotiation, which is 
implicitly given by the first-order condition of the Nash bargaining (3.5), and an additional 
constraint on the profit tax rate (3.10) that might or might not be binding. 
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(3.8)   G t qR t wL t q w = π + + π . 
(3.5)   ( ) 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 0 ~ , = β + ε − β − + βη − ⇔ = Ω w s b w w L w . 
(3.10)   π π ≤ t t  
The Lagrangian for the welfare maximisation is 
(3.11)  ( ) ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( π π π π − ϕ + Ω µ − π − − − λ − + π − + − + = t t t qR t wL t G R E t L N b wL w q w L , 
where  λ ,  µ  and ϕ  describe the shadow prices of the three constraints. Using the following 
additional expressions of the factor demand elasticities:  ) ( ~
~ ~ , ε − σ = = η s R w Rw w R , 
) )( 1 ( ~
~ ~ , ε − σ − = = η s L q Lq q L  and  ) )( 1 ( ~ , ε − σ − + σ − = η s q R  the first-order conditions with 
respect to the profit tax rate, the two factor tax rates and the net-of-tax wage rate can be 
expressed (after some manipulations) as follows:  
(3.12) 0 =
π t L    ⇔   ϕ = − λ π ) 1 (,  
(3.13) [] 0 ) 1 ( ~ ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ~ , ~ , = + Ω µ − − − λ + η λ + + η λ + − = π w wt w R q R w L w t t L w t R q t E L w t b w
w w L , 
(3.14)  () 0 ) 1 ( ~ ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ~ , ~ , = + Ω µ − − − λ + η λ + + η λ + − = π q wt q R q R q L w t t R q t R q t E L w t b w
q q L , 
(3.15) () ( ) 0 ~ ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) ( ~ , ~ , = Ω µ − + − − λ − η λ + + η λ + − = π w L w t t t R q t E L w t b w ww w w w R q R w L w w L . 
Given the complementary slackness condition  () 0 , 0 , 0 = − ϕ ≥ ϕ ≥ − π π π π t t t t , we can 
distinguish two cases. If  0 = ϕ , the profit tax constraint is not binding and the government can   32
choose the profit tax rate as a lump-sum tax optimally. If the government is restricted in using 
profit taxes, the profit tax constraint is binding, i.e.  0 > ϕ . We will discuss these two cases 
separately. 
3.3.1 WELFARE MAXIMISATION WITH OPTIMAL PROFIT TAXATION 
We first consider the case, where the government does not have to rely on distortionary 
taxation. If  0 = ϕ , the first-order condition with respect to the profit tax rate (3.12) reduces to 
1 = λ . The shadow price λ  represents the marginal cost of public funds and is equal to one. 
This indicates that the government can raise taxes to meet its revenue requirement without 
imposing any cost on society that exceeds tax revenues. Thus we have an economy without 
tax distortions but it is left with labour market distortions. To analyse how these labour 
market distortions affect welfare, we subtract (3.15) from (3.13), using  1 = λ . This yields 






















As we know from the second-order condition,  0 < Ω w ww , the shadow price µ  must be equal 
to zero if the terms in brackets are non-zero. The first term in brackets represents the net-of-
tax wage elasticity with respect to the labour tax. As long as an increase in the labour tax rate 
increases the gross wage rate however, the absolute value of the elasticity is below one (cf. 
Koskela and Schöb (2002a) for a proof), which is also in conformity with empirical studies 
[cf. e.g. Lockwood and Manning (1993) and Holm, Honkapohja and Koskela (1994)]. 
Therefore, the term in brackets must always be positive and condition (3.16) holds only if the 
shadow price  0 = µ . 
This result suggests that if the government can use profit taxation without any 
restriction, i.e. apply non-distortionary taxation, the Nash bargaining constraint is not binding. 
This has two consequences. First of all, it is optimal for the government to levy a Pigovian tax 
on energy. Solving the equation system (3.13) and (3.14) with respect to the factor tax rates 
and making use of  0 = ϕ , 1 = λ  and  0 = µ , we obtain: 
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Furthermore, the government is able to fully offset the labour market distortions. Whatever 
net-of-tax wage rate is fixed in the wage negotiation between the trade union and the firm, the 
government can choose an appropriate wage tax or subsidy to obtain the gross wage which 
optimises social welfare: 










These two tax rates ensure that both gross factor prices equal their social opportunity cost. 
The marginal productivity of energy equals the net-of-tax energy price the country has to pay 
for importing energy plus the marginal environmental damage energy input in domestic 
production causes. From substituting the definition of the gross wage rate into equation (3.18) 
we can see that  b w = ~ . Thus, the gross wage equals the disutility of labour, which in turn 
equals the social cost of labour. The wage subsidy is equal to the mark-up between the net-of-
tax wage rate and the marginal revenue product of labour the wage negotiation yields, given 
this subsidy. This establishes full employment in the sense that there is no involuntary 
unemployment anymore. These findings can be summarised as a proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3.1: If the government can set the profit tax optimally, it should levy a 
Pigovian tax on polluting inputs and it should levy a wage subsidy which completely 
offsets the mark-up between gross and net-of-tax wage rate as determined in the wage 
negotiations. 
Proposition 3.1 establishes a first-best solution as it shows that the government can fully 
internalise the environmental externality and can control the labour market imperfection. It 
thus confirms for a unionised labour market the result by Guesnerie and Laffont (1978) 
according to which, in a first-best world, the output of a price maker should be subsidised 
such that the market price equals the marginal cost [also see Boeters and Schneider (1999)]. 
3.3.2 WELFARE MAXIMIZATION WITH RESTRICTED PROFIT TAXATION 
So far we have focused on unrestricted profits. In practice, however, tax authorities may have 
difficulties in distinguishing between pure profits and return to capital investments or they 
face institutional or legal constraints. Hence, the more relevant case is where  0 > ϕ , i.e. the 
profit tax constraint is binding and the profit tax rate is set at the upper bound for the profit 
tax rate  π t .   34
As profits are always positive, we can infer directly from equation (3.12) that  1 > λ , 
i.e. the marginal cost of public funds exceeds unity. Thus, the government has to apply 
distortionary taxes to raise revenues. But this is not the only distortion the economy faces. 
Now the labour market constraint also becomes binding because, intuitively, the government 
has to apply distortionary taxes to finance the wage subsidy. Allowing for marginal mark-up 
due to wage negotiations to remain in effect has only a negative second-order effect on 
welfare, but the lower tax revenue requirement generates a first-order welfare gain. This is a 
standard second-best result according to which, in the presence of more than one distortion, it 
is not optimal to establish the first-best solution in only one sector. Formally, the shadow 
price  µ , which represents the social cost of labour market imperfection, can be signed by 
subtracting (3.15) from (3.13): 
(3.19)   0 ) 1 ( 1
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The term in brackets on the left-hand side is positive (cf. Appendix 2). Hence, condition 
(3.19) can hold only if  0 > µ , i.e. reducing the labour market distortion due to wage 
negotiations is always welfare improving. The lower the net-of-tax wage rate as a result of the 
wage negotiation, the lower the welfare loss of distorting taxes will be. This will be true 
irrespective of the question of whether the net-of-tax wage rate changes as a consequence of a 
tax rate change. 
3.3.3 OPTIMAL TAX FORMULAE WHEN THE NET-OF-TAX WAGE RATE CHANGES 
Now we turn to the more general case where the elasticity of substitution between factors of 
production differs from one. In this case the outcome of the wage negotiation is affected by 
changes in factor taxation as we showed in Section 3. Solving the system of equations (3.13)-
(3.14) for the CES production function case with respect to the tax rates and making use of 
1 > λ  and  0 > µ , we obtain the general optimal factor tax formulae (cf. Appendix 2) 
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where 










































To interpret the result, we first consider a Cobb-Douglas production function where the 
elasticity of substitution is unity and the net-of-tax wage rate is independent of the tax rates. 
The optimal factor tax formulae for this case are 

















































































Equation (3.20a) shows that when the price elasticity of output demand ε  is less than infinite 
the energy tax should be imposed for two reasons. First, it should be taxed to internalise the 
external effects caused by using polluting inputs in the production. As taxation becomes 
distortionary, however, it becomes more costly to provide the public good “environmental 
quality”, thus the environmental tax component is smaller than the Pigovian tax. The reason is 
the same as in the case with perfect labour markets as discussed in Section 2 so that we do not 
have to interpret the result again. 
Second, energy should be taxed to raise revenues. The positive second component of 
the energy tax – which might be once again called the Ramsey component – results from the 
restricted profit taxation that forces the government to rely on distortionary taxation. The 
energy tax rate is higher, the lower the feasible profit tax rate  π t  is and the higher the marginal 
cost of public funds λ .19 
A comparison of equation (3.21a) with the optimal labour tax formula for unrestricted 
profit taxation, equation (3.18), shows that the labour tax rate is now higher. The first term on 
the right-hand side represents the subsidy component of the tax rate and is increasing in the 
marginal cost of public funds λ . Τ he subsidy has to be financed by distortionary taxes and 
                                                 
19 For a thorough analysis of the role profit taxation plays for the determination of optimal tax formulae see 
Boeters (2001).   36
becomes more costly with higher λ . The second positive term, which one might refer to as 
the Ramsey component of the labour tax rate, represents the optimal tax one should levy on 
labour to minimise the excess burden of taxation. The wage subsidy, which becomes smaller 
as taxation becomes more costly, is at least partially offset by this Ramsey component. Hence, 
in the case of Nash wage bargaining with restricted profit taxation, a positive labour tax is 
possible as a part of the optimal tax treatment of factors of production. These results can be 
summarised in  
PROPOSITION 3.2: If profit taxation is restricted and factor taxes have no effect on 
wage negotiations, the government should use the energy tax to both internalise the 
external effect and to raise revenues. As the Ramsey tax component is the same for 
both taxes, the environmental tax always exceeds the labour tax rate. 
A consequence of Proposition 3.2 is that introducing green taxes to about the level of the 
labour tax rate guarantees that welfare will improve – irrespectively of the magnitude of the 
environmental damage. This confirms the result derived by Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998) 
in a tax reform model. 
If the net-of-tax wage rate is affected, there is an additional term in each tax formula – 
the second and third terms on the right-hand side in (3.20) and (3.21) respectively. These 
terms capture the effect that changes in the net-of-tax wage rate will have on the optimal 
factor taxes. Since we have already discussed the other terms, we will focus on these new 
terms only. From equation (3.20) we can deduce 
PROPOSITION  3.3: If profit taxation is restricted and factor taxes affect the wage 
negotiation, the optimal energy tax should be adjusted downwards (upwards) if the 
elasticity of substitution between energy and labour is smaller (greater) than one. 
This result has a natural interpretation. If the elasticity of substitution between energy and 
labour is less than one, a fall in the energy tax rate – compared to the case where the wage 
negotiations are not affected by tax rate changes – decreases the net-of-tax wage rate so that 
the labour market distortion due to the difference between the net-of-tax wage w and the 
social marginal cost of labour becomes smaller. On the contrary, if the elasticity of 
substitution exceeds one, a rise in the energy tax rate will decrease the net-of-tax wage rate 
and thereby reduce the labour market distortion. The optimal labour tax rate has to be adjusted 
by going in the opposite direction. With the elasticity of substitution being less than one, a   37
rise in the labour tax rate decreases the net-of-tax wage rate so that the labour market 
distortion becomes smaller and vice versa. Then the labour market distortion can be decreased 
by raising the labour tax rate. 
While the energy tax rate is always higher than the labour tax rate if  1 ≥ σ , the result 
becomes ambiguous for  1 < σ . If σ  is less than one, it is optimal to increase the labour tax 
rate and decrease the energy tax rate to alleviate the labour market distortion. Hence, in this 
case, knowledge about the magnitude of both the elasticity of substitution and the marginal 
environmental damage is required to determine the relative size of the tax rates. If the 
elasticity of substitution is not too far below one, and if the marginal environmental damage is 
considered to be significant, it is still very likely that the energy tax rate should exceed the 
labour tax rate. 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Let us conclude the section with three remarks. First, as was mentioned before, Brunello 
(1996) and Carraro, Galeotti and Gallo (1996) show that the employment dividend may 
vanish in the long run. This result, however, crucially depends on the assumption of a 
constant replacement ratio that implies that the outside option in the Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991) framework becomes proportional to the wage rate in the long run. This 
assumption may be questionable. Blanchard and Katz (1999) argue that the income of the 
unemployed does not consist of unemployment benefit payments only but also non-market 
income. They therefore assume that the replacement ratio is homogeneous of degree zero in 
the wage rate and non-market income. If the latter remains constant due to tax rate changes, 
the replacement ratio would decline and, consequently, the long-run employment dividend 
would continue to be positive, even though the quantitative effect would be smaller in the 
long run. This can be seen by splitting the income of the unemployed into two components. 
The first is proportional to the net-of-tax wage rate while the second is a constant one. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that although unemployment benefits are often paid in 
proportion to the wage rate (cf. MISSOC 1998) other additional welfare transfers are often cut 
if other income components rise. In particular for low-qualified workers the assumption of a 
constant unemployment income is more realistic than the assumption of a constant 
replacement ratio. The employment effect may therefore be still positive. 
Second, as the result derived above shows, it is very likely that a green tax reform may 
yield an ‘environmental dividend’. However, it may not be as clear that the green tax reform   38
may also yield an environmental dividend. Bayindir-Upmann and Raith (2003) show that a 
revenue-neutral green tax reform may actually worsen rather than improve the environment as 
the income effect due to higher employment may overcompensate the substitution effect due 
to higher taxes on polluting goods. Although the deterioration of the environment may be 
consistent with welfare maximisation, this is an important aspect to take into consideration if 
governments commit to meet certain environmental standards. 
  Third, the analysis presented here is a special case of the more general case of how to 
optimally tax factor incomes at source if factors are internationally mobile and there is 
involuntary unemployment. The standard result in the optimal taxation literature that a small 
open economy would be worse off if it substitutes a tax on a mobile factor such as energy for 
a labour income tax [cf. e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), Razin and Sadka (1991)] does 
not hold for economies suffering from involuntary unemployment in the economy. While the 
effect of a green tax reform does not yield a second dividend in the standard model, it yields a 
welfare improving employment effect in the latter.20 We will come back to this comparison in 
the next section. 
In conclusion, this section shows that there exists a second dividend of environmental 
taxes in the form of an employment dividend. Using green tax revenues to reduce labour taxes 
will reduce unemployment and therefore raise welfare. The existence of other market 
distortions therefore provide another rationale for the introduction of environmental taxes. 
4. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
Competitiveness is a rather vague concept of a economic policy objective. However, as it is 
very present in the political debate about green tax reform, pure economic theory should be 
applied to that concept. In this section, we will consider the impact green taxes may have on 
the competitiveness of a small open country first for countries with functioning labour 
markets (Section 4.1) and then for countries suffering from unemployment (Section 4.2). 
Before proceeding, we first have to find an appropriate definition of the 
competitiveness of an economy. Competitiveness is not an end in itself but is a useful notion 
for understanding the reaction to a country’s policy moves. In line with Alesina and Perotti 
(1997), we measure competitiveness by the negative of the unit production cost of its exports. 
                                                 
20 The analysis of papers dealing with taxing mobile capital at source in the presence of labour market 
imperfections can easily be adopted to the case of taxing polluting resource inputs [cf. Koskela and Schöb 
(2002a, 2002b), Richter and Schneider (2001)]   39
In general the production cost is a function of the gross-of-tax factor prices and the output 
level, ) , ~ , ~ ( Y q w C . For the linear-homogeneous production function used in Section 3, we have 
(4.1)   Y q w c Y q w C ) ~ , ~ ( ) , ~ , ~ ( = . 
where c is the unit production cost. The lower c is, the more the country can sell in the world 
market for Y, and the higher its competitiveness is. 
4.1 GREEN TAXES AND COMPETITIVENESS: CLEARING LABOUR MARKETS 
Does a green tax on internationally mobile energy resources weaken the competitiveness of a 
small open economy? Looking at economies with functioning labour markets, this question 
can be answered by looking at the related literature on taxing mobile capital at source (cf. 
Richter and Schneider 2001). MacDougall (1960) was the first who pointed out that taxing a 
perfectly mobile factor at source would always decrease the welfare of a country. In the 
nineties, this question was discussed again with a particular focus on tax competition between 
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  Figure 4.1: Energy taxation and competitive labour markets   40
The way a green tax reform can affect the competitiveness can be shown graphically. In 
Figure 4.1, the upper part shows the labour market, in which the initial equilibrium is 
characterised by the gross wage rate 
1 ~ w  and the employment level L
1. The lower part shows 
the energy market. Without green taxes, the firm will increase energy input up to the point 
where the marginal productivity of energy equals the producer price q. Given the employment 
level L
1, the country will import the amount of energy 
1 R  and has to pay the resource owners 
E'H'K'I'. This area is equivalent the triangle AGD in the labour market diagram. On the other 
hand, the triangle A'H'E' in the energy market diagram equals the gross wage income, 
represented by the rectangle DGPM in the labour market diagram.21 
Note that by assuming a linear-homogenous production technology and perfect 
competition in the output market, the gross wage rate is completely determined by the energy 
price q and the world output price p. Now assume that the government unilaterally imposes an 
energy tax  q t . As the whole burden falls on the firm, energy input must become more 
productive. This can be achieved by reducing energy input for any level of employment. As 
ceteris paribus a higher resource price increases marginal cost [cf. equation (4.1)], the gross 
wage rate has to fall in order to keep marginal cost constant. This induces a reduction in 
employment as the workers will work less if the wage rate falls. 
The new equilibrium will be achieved with the gross wage rate 
3 ~ w  that ensures that 
marginal cost of production remain constant. The new equilibrium employment level is L
3, 
the new equilibrium energy input level is 
3 R  and the new domestic gross energy price is 
) 1 ( ~
q t q q + = . Wage income falls to HIOM (in the labour market diagram), the energy costs 
are E'F'J'I' (in the energy market diagram) with C'D'F'E' being the energy tax revenues. 
Competitiveness in the definition chosen has not changed as long as the world output 
market determines the marginal cost. Nevertheless, the decision whether or not to introduce 
energy taxes unilaterally has severe consequences for domestic welfare. Consequences which 
become important if a country has to decide whether it should meet e.g. the Kyoto protocol 
requirements of reducing CO2 emissions. 
To see the welfare effect, assume that the government has introduced a labour tax 
instead of an energy tax which also ensures an equilibrium employment level L
3. As the 
                                                 
21 A linear-homogeneous production technology imply convex marginal productivity curves which do not 
intersect with the axis. For didactical purposes Figure 4.1 uses linear curves only. As a consequence, the 
corresponding areas in the labour market and the energy are not necessarily of the same size.   41
whole tax burden falls on the worker, the gross wage is not affected but the net-of-tax wage 
rate falls to 
3 ~ w . The labour tax rate thus equals the distance DH = 
3 1 ~ ~ w w − . The new marginal 
labour productivity curve intersects with the gross wage curve at F. The energy input 
necessary to sustain this equilibrium can be found by the intersection of the marginal energy 
productivity curve  ) , (
3 L R fR  with the gross energy price curve q. It turns out that the energy 
input 
* 3 R  is larger than in the case where the introduction of the energy tax leads to an 
employment level L
3. 
The welfare loss due to the introduction of the labour tax equals the area FGI shaded 
in grey which is associated with the tax revenues of DFIH. The total loss in workers’ net-of-
tax wage income can also be seen in the energy market diagram. Here the loss is given by the 
area A'H'G'B'. 
Now, assume that the government replaces the labour tax and levies an energy tax 
which ensures the same employment level L
3. Such a reform further reduces domestic income 
which consists of the net-of-tax wage income plus tax revenues from the triangle B'G'E' in the 
energy market to B'D'C' + C'D'F'E' = B'D'F'E'. The additional loss equals the triangle B'G'E' 
shaded in grey. As the net-of-tax wage rate remains the same, 
3 ~ w , the total income loss equals 
the loss in tax revenues that is equal to C'D'E'F'. 
The energy tax thus has two negative welfare effects. First, there is the welfare loss 
resulting from a fall in the net-of-tax wage rate from 
1 ~ w  to 
3 ~ w  as the fall in the labour rent 
DGIH is only partly compensated by the tax revenues DFIH. Second, obtaining the same 
labour rent with an energy tax instead of a labour tax would result in lower tax revenues by 
the amount of (D'G'F'). The total welfare loss thus is FGI + D'G'F'. Figure 4.1 illustrates that a 
small open economy can maximise tax revenues for any given employment level by setting 
the green tax equal to zero. By contrast, one can infer from the analysis that for any given 
level of public expenditures, employment and energy input is maximised. As the labour rent is 
increasing with employment, welfare is maximised as well. 
As both inputs are maximised if there is no energy tax, output is maximised as well. 
So far, we have assumed a constant world market price for the output good. If the output 
demand is downward sloping – as assumed in Section 3 – the output maximum is also a unit 
cost minimum. Hence, raising the energy tax weakens the competitiveness of economies 
facing downward sloping demand curves for their products. Whether welfare or 
competitiveness is the policy objective, the conclusion that energy taxes are harmful is the   42
same. If energy is perfectly mobile, there is no reason other than improving the environment 
for imposing green taxes. For economies with functioning labour markets, this analysis 
confirms Bovenberg’s (1999) conclusion that “the case for environmental taxes should be 
made primarily on environmental grounds... green taxes are worthwhile as long as the 
environmental benefits are non-negative” (p. 441) . Proposition 4.1 summarises. 
PROPOSITION 4.1: If the labour market is competitive, a small open economy 
should not levy an energy tax for other reasons than to improve domestic 
environmental quality. The competitiveness of the economy is not affected by the 
energy tax, though. 
The next section shows that this conclusion does not hold for economies suffering from 
involuntary unemployment. 
4.2 GREEN TAXES AND COMPETITIVENESS: IMPERFECT LABOUR MARKETS 
In Section 3.2 we have shown (cf. Figure 3.1) that in the presence of involuntary 
unemployment, there exists a green-tax equilibrium with higher tax rates on energy than on 
labour which yields the same level of output and same tax revenue as, but a higher level of 
employment than, the existing labour-tax equilibrium. As firms face the same unit cost of 
production in the green tax system as in the labour tax system, the move from the labour-tax 
equilibrium to a green-tax equilibrium maintains the economy’s international competitiveness 
in the sense of our definition of keeping the unit production cost and the terms of trade 
constant. 
More, however, can be said if we analyse a marginal revenue-neutral green tax reform 
as we can then allow for a change in the output level that goes along with changes in unit cost 
of production, and hence the competitiveness of the country. To analyse the change in the 
competitiveness of the economy, we thus have to calculate the effect, a marginal revenue-
neutral green tax reform has on the unit cost of production (cf. Appendix 3): 
















Recalling our definition of competitiveness and assuming that involuntary unemployment is 
not completely eliminated, the following proposition summarises.   43
PROPOSITION 4.2: As long as the labour tax rate exceeds the energy tax rate, a 
marginal revenue-neutral green-tax reform will increase both the international 
competitiveness and the output of an economy with involuntary unemployment due to 
too high net-of-tax wages. Competitiveness is maximised when the energy tax rate 
equals the labour tax rate. 
To interpret and understand these results it is useful to consider Figure 4.2, which is 
constructed in the same way as Figure 3.1. Figure 4.2 shows two conceivable paths of 
consecutive marginal tax reforms starting in the labour tax system A and ending in the green 
tax system B. Up to points C or C' where tt wq = , output will increase. A further increase in tq 
will result in marginal output reductions. 
Up to point C or C' employment will increase. However, an increase of tq sufficiently 
far beyond the point where tt qw =  will not necessarily increase employment further because 
there is a countervailing output effect. A green tax reform will definitely create the incentive 
to substitute employment for energy consumption. However, the output decline such a reform 
induces in the range where tt qw >  will, in itself, reduce the factor demands. If tq is sufficiently 
far above tw, the output effect may dominate the substitution effect such that employment 
declines at the margin. 
 
  Figure 4.2: Marginal green tax reforms   44
With paths I and II, Figure 4.2 distinguishes two different possibilities that depend on the 
price elasticity of the demand curve for the economy’s products. If the demand elasticity is 
small, the initial rise and subsequent fall in output will be small and the substitution effect 
will dominate the output effect. This case is represented by path I. Moving from C to B 
further increases employment while output is falling. If output demand is very price elastic, as 
represented by path II, there will be an interval on the path II from C' to B where output and 
employment are falling simultaneously.22 
The ambiguity with respect to output translates to the country’s international 
competitiveness. Since equation (4.2) says that the terms of trade are a declining function of 
output, the economy’s competitiveness increases with a marginal green tax reform as long as 
tt qw <  (right of C and C') and declines when tt qw >  (left of C and C'). Hence, initial green tax 
reforms do not only improve the environment and raise employment, as long as output effect 
is positive, they also increase the competitiveness of an economy.  
The standard result in the optimal taxation literature – applied to green taxation in 
Section 4.1 – is that a small open economy would be worse off if it substitutes a tax on a 
mobile factor such as energy for a labour income tax [cf. e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991)]. 
By contrast, we have to conclude that when there is involuntary unemployment in the 
economy, the effects of such a green tax reform are favourable. A green tax reform will 
induce a technical substitution in the production process that replaces energy use with 
employment. Since energy is priced at its true national opportunity cost, but the price of 
labour is above its opportunity cost, there is a strong presumption that the reform will boost 
employment and bring about an increase in the competitiveness of a country. 
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES ARE RESOURCE TAXES 
Since environmental issues are typically tied to the use of exhaustible resources, a 
comprehensive analysis of environmental tax incidence should take into account the impact of 
green taxes on the world producer prices of exhaustible resources such as gas and oil products 
as these affect the time path of extraction. The literature on environmental taxation has, until 
recently, not recognised this important relation in evaluating the impact of co-ordinated 
attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
                                                 
22 For the same reason, moving from A to C' increases resource demand. This confirms the analysis by Bayindir-
Upmann and Raith (2003).   45
Resource prices are principally determined by the user cost of the resource, i.e. the 
rent the resource owner can obtain from extracting the resource. An excise tax, introduced by 
a sole country with a negligible share in global energy demand, does not affect the world 
energy price. It is therefore optimal for such a small country to impose a green tax which 
leads the country to meet its own environmental standards or to meet international 
environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol. For the welfare analysis it is not necessary 
to incorporate the reactions on the world resource markets. By contrast, however, if all 
countries introduce environmental taxes the burden of the green tax will partly be borne by 
today’s resource consumer and partly by the resource-extracting country. The welfare effects 
are then twofold and should be considered separately. 
The main underlying idea can be described graphically. For simplicity assume first 
that the whole resource stock can be used in one period only. If we abstract from extraction 
costs, this implies that consumers face a fixed supply R0. In the absence of pollution, it is 















Figure 4.3: The one-period model 
In Figure 4.3, total surplus is maximised at R0, yielding a surplus of ACR0O. In the presence 
of externalities, indicated by the marginal environmental damage curve MEDi, 2 , 1 = i , it 
remains optimal to consume the whole stock as long as  0 ) ( ) ( 0 0 > − R MED R MWP , i.e. if the 
marginal net rent of consuming the last unit of the resource is still positive. The existence of a 
resource rent then completely compensates for the externality. In this case would be no need   46
for environmental policy measures. A tax smaller than MWP(R0), however, would not alter 
the allocation, but affect the distribution of rents as the entire tax burden falls on the supplier. 
If the environmental damage is more severe, as indicated by the MED1 curve, it 
becomes optimal to reduce extraction from R0 to R2. In this case, a Pigovian tax 
) ( 2 1 R MED tP =  maximises welfare, given by ABO. The welfare gain, compared to the 
laissez-faire solution equals BEC. 
Now consider the case where a fixed resource stock can be consumed in two periods. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.4 where the total resource stock is plotted on the horizontal axis 
and the period demands on the vertical axes. In the absence of pollution, the social benefit 
from resource consumption can be represented by the aggregate marginal willingness-to-pay 
curve  MWPi. In the presence of externalities, however, we have to subtract the marginal 
environmental damage, caused by the consumption of the natural resource, from the marginal 
willingness to pay in order to derive total welfare. This yields the marginal social benefit 
curve MSBi. For period 2 the marginal cost and benefit are discounted by the interest rate r 
















Figure 4.4: A two-period model of exhaustible resource consumption 
Without internalising externalities the market equilibrium equalises the present value of the 
marginal willingness to pay, i.e. MWP MWP r 12 1 =+ /() , which maximises the present value 
of the consumer surplus. In Figure 4.4. the curves for the first period are plotted from left to 
right, the curves for the second period are plotted from right to left. Thus, the distance O1B 
denotes the consumption in the first period and O2B the consumption in the second period,   47
respectively. However, due to the presence of externalities, a reduction of the first period’s 
consumption, accompanied by an increase of second period’s consumption enhances welfare. 
This can be achieved by e.g. introducing a Pigovian tax  P t  equal to C1D in the first period and 
) 1 ( D C2 r + ⋅  in the second period, respectively. Such a combination of taxes equalises the 
present value of the marginal social benefit i.e. MSB MSB r 12 1 =+ /() . The resulting welfare 
gain – compared to the laissez-faire situartion – is shown by the shaded area. 
The implications of this simple model can easily be generalised. As resource 
consumption falls, marginal environmental damage decreases, and so should the Pigovian tax. 
Ulph and Ulph (1994) and Farzin (1996) therefore emphasise that what matters is the time 
path of the environmental tax rather than its level. To delay extraction, the initial 
environmental tax should be high and then fall over time.23 In the two-period model, however, 
the natural resource will not necessarily be exhausted. If the MSB1-curve intersects the 
MSB2/(1+r)-curve at negative prices, it would be optimal to consume a smaller amount such 
that  MSBt = 0 is ensured in each period. Such an outcome does not carry over to model with 
an infinite time horizon problem: if there is a minimum fixed amount of the resource 
consumed in each period, determined by MSBt = 0, exhaustion of the whole resource stock 
would be beneficial to society – despite the existence of pollution. 
The implication of this model are not only important with respect to the determination 
of the optimal time path of environmental taxes. The results with respect to international 
distribution are also striking. If resource-owning countries have optimised the time path of 
extraction and if all resource-importing countries introduce environmental taxes, total demand 
will fall in each period if the producer price remains constant. This cannot be an equilibrium, 
as the total resource stock would not be exhausted and a price taker would have an incentive 
to increase sales in some periods. As a consequence, both the producer price and the resource 
rent obtained by the resource-extracting country falls. Since the marginal environmental 
damage is an increasing function of resource consumption, a shift from present consumption 
towards future consumption is welfare enhancing. A delay in consumption reduces both the 
absolute amount of emissions and the present value of the environmental damage. One could 
therefore take the view that if consumption of the natural resource is not taxed, resource-
consuming countries actually subsidise the resource-extracting country, by an amount equal to 
the value of the environmental damage that the households inflict upon themselves. In this   48
sense, it is not the polluter who pays for the internalisation of the externality, but the producer 
of the non-renewable resource damage [cf. Amundsen and Schöb (1999)]. 
These distributional implications provide incentives for co-ordinating environmental 
policies in order to capture resource rents even if there are no transboundary or global 
pollution problems present, which are normally considered as the reason to co-ordinate 
environmental policies [e.g. Hoel (1992)]. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol may be exploited 
by resource-consuming countries by using a carbon tax as a new form of tariff which allows 
these countries to capture some of the resource rents. If, for example, all resource-consuming 
countries agree to introduce a carbon tax that increases with the real interest rate, we know 
from the literature on optimal resource taxation that such a co-ordinated per-unit resource tax 
would leave the time path of extraction and hence resource consumption completely 
unaffected. This follows directly from the Hotelling rule [cf. e.g. Dasgupta and Heal (1979), 
Sinn (1982)]. Such a tax would have no effect at all on the environment and would thus be a 
pure rent-capturing tax.24  
If the resource-owning country can exercise market power, by contrast, they may 
attempt to raise the initial resource price, because this would reduce the environmental tax and 
allow the resource-owner to capture some of the tax revenues that the resource-consuming 
countries would otherwise collect [cf. Wirl (1994)]. The resource-consuming countries then 
fail to completely extract rents. Nevertheless, co-ordination would always allow the resource-
consuming countries to capture some of the resource rent (and the monopoly rent). Indeed, as 
was shown by Karp and Newbery (1991), in the absence of externalities, the buyer’s market 
power exceeds that of the sellers, as they succeed in reducing the initial producer price. 
If the OPEC countries commit to raising oil prices, it might increase political pressure 
in resource-consuming countries to reduce the high taxes on fuel. This happened in the fall 
2000 when French truck drivers forced the French government to reduce fuel taxes. A single 
country can actually reduce consumer prices by lowering the green tax. If all countries do, 
                                                                                                                                                          
23 Also see Ploeg and Withagen (1991) and Kolstad and Krautkraemer (1993). 
24 Newbery (1976) and Bergstrom (1982) were the first to show that resource-consuming countries can secure 
the entire resource rent from the resource-owning country by co-ordinating their tariffs or their national excise 
tax policy. The theoretical findings are in line with the empirical. For example, in the countries of the 
European Union, tax rates on gasoline have increased substantially over time. Although these taxes were not 
primarily introduced to internalize national or global externalities, their effects are similar to those of 
environmental taxes. Hoeller and Coppel (1992) calculate the implicit carbon tax of fuel taxes and conclude 
that, at least for most European countries, the implicit carbon tax is considerably higher than the taxes 
suggested by energy tax reform proposals. Since the mid eighties the real producer price has fallen while the   49
however, the whole tax reduction would result in an increase in the producer price for the 
reason given above. 
The lasting discussion of whether or not to implement a carbon tax may have adverse 
effects on the environment. Announcing the imposition of co-ordinated carbon taxes (even if 
the taxes are not intended to extract rents) acts like an expropriation threat to resource owners. 
As a consequence, the resource-owning countries have incentives to increase present 
extraction prior to the date the tax is introduced, so as to reduce future losses [cf. Long 
(1975), Konrad, Olsen and Schöb (1994)]. 
In summing up this section, the optimal environmental policy design requires a 
completely different time path for the environmental taxes if co-ordination of environmental 
policies is intended to internalise global environmental problems and if resource-consuming 
countries try to extract some of the resource rent from the resource owners. While it might be 
optimal for a single country to reduce its consumption of a natural resource in all periods, this 
may not be true for all resource-consuming countries altogether. If it is guaranteed that the use 
of at least one unit of the resource in a time period is beneficial, the whole resource stock 
should be used up in finite time. Hence, optimal environmental taxation must try to delay 
extraction of the resource rather than reduce resource consumption in every period. To delay 
extraction, however, an environmental tax is required which decreases over time. 
APPENDIX 1: SECOND-BEST OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAX 


































































































The determinant  D  is given by [using (2.12)] 



































ϕ = . 
                                                                                                                                                          
real tax rate has increased steadily. These countervailing developments have left the consumer price more or 
less unaffected until the mid nineties evidence [cf. Amundsen and Schöb (1999)].   50































































































Applying the definition (2.12) shows that the last term of the numerator is zero. Furthermore, 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Substituting in the tax on the clean good (A1.3) allows us to simplify the second term of 
(A1.4) as well. Finally, substituting (A1.4) in (A1.5) gives: 






















Adding  E x H e t d d ∂ ∂ − '  on both sides, adding the two terms of the right-hand side with the 
Ramsey components of the dirty good together and substituting in equations (A1.3) and 
(2.12), this can be rewritten as: 
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Applying the several restricting assumptions discussed in the main text give the respective 
optimal tax formulae (2.13) to (2.15). 
APPENDIX 2: RESTRICTED PROFIT TAXATION 
Subtracting (3.15) from (3.13) implies that the following condition must hold: 
(A2.1)   [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < − λ − = + Ω − Ω µ wL t w w wt ww t . 
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where the first term in brackets on the right-hand side is the net-of-tax wage elasticity with 
respect to the labour tax rate. As has been argued above, this elasticity is larger than  1 − . 
Hence (A2.2) is negative and the condition (A2.1) holds only if  . 0 > µ    52
Using this condition, we can derive the optimal tax formulae for the second case when 
the wage rate changes. For the case  0 > ϕ  and hence  π π = t t  rearranging the equations (3.13) 
and (3.14) yields 
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with  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( q w wt wt t t
w q + + Ω − = Ω  (cf. Koskela and Schöb 2002b). Applying Cramer’s 
rule and using the fact that the determinant of the left-hand side matrix is equal to 
σε = ∆ wLqR  yields 
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Using the explicit elasticity formulas, we have 
(A2.6)   ( ) s cY s s cY R q L w w R q R w R q R σ − = η − − η = η − η ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , ) 1 ( ~ ~ , 
(A2.7)   ( ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ~ ~
~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , s cY s s cY L w R q q L w L q L w L − σ − = η − η − = − η − η . 
Substituting in (A2.6) and (A2.7) in (A2.4) and (A2.5) respectively, we obtain conditions 
(2.20) and (2.21). 
APPENDIX 3: COMPETITIVENESS 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the profit tax is equal to zero. From the 
government budget condition (3.11) we then get 
(A3.1)   [ ] [ ] q q w q q w w q w w dt q wL t q qR t qR dt w qR t w wL t wL dG ~ ~ ~ ~ + + + + + = . 
The elasticities of factor demands are given by η σσ ε Rq q R q R s ,%% () ( ) ≡= − + − − 1,  
) ( ~
~ ~ , ε − σ = ⋅ ≡ η s R w Rw w R ,  L w Lw w L
~
~ ~ , ≡ η =− + − σσ ε s() ,  L q Lq q L
~
~ ~ , ⋅ ≡ η   =− − () ( ) 1 s σε  
where  cY L w s ~ ≡  denotes the cost share of labour and  cY L w s ~ 1 ) 1 ( − ≡ − cY R q ~ =  denotes   53
the cost share of energy and σ  denotes the constant elasticity of substitution as in Section 3. 
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Setting dG = 0 yields an expression that reveals how the labour tax rate changes due to a 
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To analyse the change in the competitiveness of the economy, we have to calculate the effect, 
a marginal revenue-neutral green tax reform has on the unit cost of production. The impact of 
a revenue-neutral green tax reform on the unit cost of production is given by 
dc w q c wdt c qdt w w q q ( %, %) %% =+ . Applying Shephard’s lemma  L Y c C w w = = ~ ~ ,  R Y c C q q = = ~ ~  and 
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Assuming positive marginal tax revenues for the labour tax rate [cf. equation (A4.1)], the 
denominator is always positive. Substituting in the definitions of the (cross-)price elasticities 
of factor demands in the nominator of equation (A3.3) yields  σ = η − η q R q L ~ , ~ ,  and 
σ − = η − η w R w L ~ , ~ , . This gives us condition (4.2).   54
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